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Abstract
This paper explores Hermann Cohen’s engagement with, and appropriation of, Maimonides to
refute the common assumption that Cohen’s endeavor was to harmonize Judaism with Western
culture. Exploring the changes of Cohen’s conception of humility from Ethik des reinen Willens
to the Ethics of Maimonides and Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, this paper
highlights the centrality of the collective Jewish mission to bear witness against the dominant
order of Western civilization and philosophy in Cohen’s Jewish thought.
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The nature of Hermann Cohen’s engagement with the philosophy of Maimonides is difficult to fully
discern. Arthur Hyman, in his article “Maimonidean Elements in Hermann Cohen’s Philosophy of
Religion,” asks the question: “To what extent is Cohen a genuine interpreter of Maimonides’ thought and
to what extent does Maimonides provide a kind of ‘prooftext’ for Cohen’s own philosophy?” Hyman
acknowledges, “The answer to this question is not easily discovered.”1 The difficulty that Hyman
encounters in this line of inquiry is that Cohen is not a straightforward exegete and yet is nevertheless a
profound interpreter of the authors and works he comments upon. This peculiarity is a result of Cohen’s
innovative hermeneutics, which involves unfurling ideas beyond the limits their author may have set for
them. As a result, it is perhaps more helpful to explore the nature of the role Maimonides plays in
Cohen’s thought rather than assessing whether or not Cohen was a “good” Maimonidean.
Cohen’s engagement with Maimonides’ work is profound and is suddenly 7.0stravelerbound up with
significant changes in his late thought. In this essay, my task is to trace the ways in which Cohen’s
prolonged engagement with Maimonides effects, or at least reflects, transformations in his thought. I will
follow one particular arc, the development of the virtues of truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) and modesty
3
(Bescheidenheit) from Ethik des reinen Willens2 to Ethics of Maimonides and Religion of Reason
4
out of the Sources of Judaism, paying particular attention to the development of the role of the virtue of
humility (Demut) in Cohen’s later texts.5

God, the Foundational Hypothesis
In order to understand the particular nature of the dialogue that Cohen facilitates with Maimonides’
thought, it is imperative to begin with the concept of God operative in Ethik des reinen Willens. Indeed,
Cohen’s sole mention of Maimonides in the Ethik is in the chapter titled “The Idea of God.” In this
chapter he lauds the “Arab-Islamic and the Arab-Jewish theologians [Dogmatik] and philosophers of

religion” who “pursued in true [wahrhafter] religiosity the fundamental idea that God was an Idea.” Not
coincidentally, among these thinkers, Cohen distinguishes Maimonides as the superlative “teacher
and leader of rationalism [Lehrer und Führer des Rationalismus].”6 However, to understand why Cohen
lauds Maimonides, and in what manner Maimonides is meant to receive this praise, we must understand
Cohen’s own philosophical discussion of God and its relation to his systematic exposition of ethics.
Cohen’s methodology, his critical idealism, is rooted in a careful opposition to what he defines as
“Metaphysics.” “Idealism stands in a methodological opposition to everything otherwise called
metaphysics. This opposition is irreconcilable.”7 Metaphysics, which haunts both naturalism and
Romantic Idealism (whose most famous representatives are Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling), fails to
recognize the distinction between ethics and logic, the latter being the form of knowing (Erkenntnis)
operative in the realm of the natural sciences. In short, Cohen argues that by ignoring this distinction both
the naturalist— by only recognizing the empirical self—and the Romantic Idealist—by deducing ethics
from the given state of affairs—fail to recognize the ideal. Both groups of thinkers, then, apply the logic
of the sciences, that of “identity,” willy-nilly to ethics. And while the concept of “identity is appropriate
[richtig] for logic . . . it is a pitfall for ethics.”8 As a result, both the naturalist and the Romantic Idealist
fail to respect the methodological distinction between the two realms of knowledge, and as a result, they
nullify ethics, properly speaking, altogether.
Cohen employs the concept of God to distinguish the sort of knowing appropriate to ethics, the logic of
the ideal, while nevertheless preserving the legitimacy of the logic of identity for natural science. Indeed,
God’s function is not merely to secure the distinction of these two realms of knowledge but also to secure
their harmony with one another. “Being is not only the being of thinking, but also the being of willing
[Das Sein ist nicht nur das Sein des Denkens, sondern auch das des Wollens]. And this willing is the
pure will [reine Wollen], the will of morality [Wollen der Sittlichkeit]. Thus for being there persists a
double correlation, to thinking and to willing [doppelte Korrelation, zum Denken und zum Wollen.]”9
God is a function of reason—indeed, reason’s ultimate and deepest function, Truth (Wahrheit).10 God as
Wahrheit, as the two-fold nature of being, breaks with metaphysics’s prioritization of identity. Ethics,
while tied to the mode of being operative in the natural sciences (logic), nevertheless maintains its own
correlation with being and is thus oriented by its own distinct form of knowing.
Cohen describes this correlation secured by God as a “combination [ Verbindung],”11 or better an “accord
[Einklang],”12 between logic and ethics, two separate, quasi-autonomous members of his system of
philosophy. As a result, Truth reflects the ideality of actuality, that logic and ethics, i.e., the worlds of
nature and morality, can ultimately be reconciled (though not sublated). Truth is more than simply logic,
that is, the mode of truth operative in the natural sciences; rather, the deepest account of Truth is the
accord of logic and ethics.13 The idea of God is the accord, the Einklang, of ethics and science. What this
means for Cohen, at least in the Ethik, is that the natural world is not so constituted as to make the ethical
task impossible: in other words, nature will not perish, thus ensuring that the infinite task of ethics can
continue unhindered. It is precisely in this sense that the concept of God serves as the ultimate hypothesis
and foundation of Cohen’s thought, a hypothesis that both preserves the distinction between ethics and
logic while nevertheless securing their harmonious accord. It is in performing this function that “the
concept of God becomes the concept of Truth [Begriff der Wahrheit].”14
As a foundational hypothesis, the idea of God serves not merely as the transcendental conditions for the
possibility of the moral endeavor, but as such also serves as the cornerstone of a hermeneutical lens that
approaches actuality (Wirklichkeit) through the lens of the ideal.15 In other words, the concept of God
secures, on a transcendental level, the ideality of actuality, such that ethics is not to be restricted to the

realm of actuality but is rather governed by its attention to the ideal. Thus Cohen can make the claim, that
“the natural will [natürliche Wille] is not the pure [reine] will. The natural human being [Mensch] is not
the pure human being. The empirical I is not the pure I.”16 Instead, the Self is an ideal construct. The Self
is always underway, always in a formative process.
God’s radical transcendence is essential to this double correlation between logic and ethics, which secures
both the legitimacy of ethical knowing, and God’s status as Truth. Indeed, it is Maimonides’ relentless
war on anthropomorphism and myth that Cohen appreciates in this context, as that which first secures the
character of radical transcendence for the idea of God.17 Cohen appropriates Maimonides’ war on myth
and God’s attributes in order to construe the idea of God in such a way that it has a purely functional
meaning, and entails no metaphysical implications. Cohen claims that “All attributes are evil, which do
not solely bring to expression the harmonious coherence [harmonischen Zusammenhang] between logic
and ethics.”18 In other words, it would be a serious methodological error to conceive of God as a personal
being, or indeed as possessing any metaphysical attributes whatsoever, as this would jeopardize the
Einklang of logic and ethics. Thus Cohen finds in Maimonides’ decision to “detach the concept of life
from the concept of God ” an act of unparalleled philosophical rigor,19 in that it secures the necessary
conditions for the transcendence of God, which is essential for God’s status as Truth.

Truthfulness and Modesty
Unsatisfied with Kant’s conceptions of selfhood and of autonomy,20 Cohen stresses that the Self is always
in process, and is always being grounded by means of its relationship to legality. Cohen rejects Kant’s
claim that there is a given self that legislates to itself as a residue of metaphysical psychology, and argues
instead that the Self is created through the process of legislation. “From law-giving [Gesetzgebung] it
[i.e., the Self ] arrives: in it [i.e., the Self] first attests to itself [bezeugt sich das Selbst], in it [i.e., the lawgiving] the Self engenders itself [in ihr erzeugt es sich.]”21 And for the Self to be properly founded, access
to Allheit is required.22 Indeed, Allheit is not only constitutive of the ideal for which the Self strives, but it
also provides the (non)foundation upon which the ethical Self is grounded. Or, as Cohen puts it, “Allheit
constitutes not only the successful end but rather also the proper beginning [Die Allheit bildet nicht nur
das glückliche Ende, sondern sie ist auch der rechte Anfang].”23 This statement has two very important
implications. First, the Self qua ideal is rooted in proper foundations, i.e., Allheit. And since Allheit is an
ideal, the individual’s relation to it is always solely that of a task; it is a task performed repeatedly through
ethical action. Second, it is essential that one’s methodological foundations are secure: the Allheit must be
genuine, lest one be led astray by false ideals which lead to distorted notions of the Self.
The last seven chapters of Ethik des reinen Willens offer a theory of virtues to stabilize the notion of the
Self, which, because it is aimed at an unattainable ideal, must of necessity always be in flux. The virtues
are a way of incorporating the affects into one’s behavior in order to stabilize one’s Self without violating
the purity of the Self ’s action (Handlung), i.e., the Self ’s task of perpetually creating itself. Cohen
divides his virtues into two orders, Honor (Ehre) and Love (Liebe). While love is secondary, in that it is
tied to relative communities, honor is the virtue grounded in Allheit. According to Cohen, “true honor
lays the monitoring authority [Kontrollinstanz] in the Allheit,” and therefore it alone is the order of virtue
that properly grounds law and the ethical state (Staat),24 and thus also it alone lays the proper foundations
for the generation of the ethical Self. Now, to be sure, as finite human beings, we necessarily exist as both
juridical persons (i.e., members of the ethical state properly rooted in Allheit) and as members of
particular communities (which are part of Mehrheit, an order subordinate to Allheit), which ensures the
necessity of both orders of virtues (virtues of honor and virtues of love). However, Cohen gives priority to

the virtues of honor, although these virtues are correlated with those of love, as we will see in the case of
truthfulness and modesty.
For Cohen, genuine ethics, an ethics independent of logic, demands that the self is not simply its own
givenness, or reflection upon this givenness, i.e., “representation [Vorstellung],”25 but it must rather also
consist in a “striving.”26 Since the concept of Truth for Cohen secures the genuine existence of the Ought,
the reality of the ideal, such that ethics is a sphere of human action correlated with but not deduced from
logic, the conception of selfhood should be freed from the realm of the given. As a virtue, truthfulness is
absolutely foundational for Cohen, in that in the final analysis, the Self, writ large, correlated with Allheit,
can only be reached through self-knowledge (Selbst-erkenntnis).27 As a virtue, “truthfulness means the
constancy of moral work, thus truthfulness designates the route of knowledge, in the constant serious
work of the self to implement itself in so far as it can make itself actual.”28 Truthfulness, then, is the
ultimate expression of the ideality of the self as oriented towards the universal, not only as a perpetual
process in construction, but also in its practical connections to the state, the need for the philosophical
accountability of ethics, the need for honesty in contracts and oaths, and so on. It is the bedrock of
everything else.
However, modesty as a virtue is necessary as a correlate with truthfulness because it checks and softens
the harshness that accompanies the latter. Truthfulness is unwavering, demanding the ideal and accepting
nothing less. But modesty accounts for the “lacks and frailties” that inevitably accompany actual, not
ideal, individual human beings.29 Modesty is a middle way between, on the one hand, the harsh standards
of truthfulness against which we and the Other always fall short, and on the other against holding no one
accountable at all.
Modesty provides an indispensible condition for morality. Whereas truthfulness is rooted in honor,
modesty is rooted in love, and “love does not require the fiction that all human beings are good. Were
that the case there would be no method for the steady progress of moral self-consciousness [den stetigen
Fortschritt des sittlichen Selbstbewusstseins].”30 We make mistakes, we are imperfect, but with the virtue
of modesty we can forgive ourselves our shortcomings— and there will always be shortcomings given
that the ideal is impossible to achieve—because we realize that our Selves are works in progress. Modesty
then serves two essential functions for Cohen. First, it helps prevent one from despairing of morality, both
from one’s own failures and for the failures of the collective. Without modesty, the very rationality of the
moral endeavor threatens to collapse. Second, modesty prevents hatred and undue scrutiny of the Other
since it is firmly rooted to a belief in the rehabilitation and improvement of all human beings. Modesty
“prevents the full identification of the judged action with the person [who performed said action].”31 For
Cohen, all forms of unconditional condemnation against any human being are “not merely vulgar and
abominable”— indeed, “nothing is more wicked.”32
It is important to note that in the Ethik, Cohen draws a distinction between modesty (Bescheidenheit) and
humility (Demut), which becomesa significant virtue in his later thought. Modesty, the main defense
against hatred, allows one to guard oneself against jealousy by properly estimating one’s own worth in
order to attend to the Other. In a manner more akin to Aristotle’s Phronesis than Levinas’s notion of
limitless obligation to the Other, Cohen writes, “Modesty is selfrespect just as much as respect for the
Other.”33 Part of modesty is properly estimating the Other in regard to oneself, being neither too harsh nor
too awed. Only in this manner can one extirpate jealousy, which Cohen thinks is one of the main roots of
hatred.

Humility, however, at least in Ethik des reinen Willens, is a “fiction that operates with the feeling of one’s
own shame [Unwert].”34 Without a healthy sense of self-worth, the steady battle against jealousy is either
not undertaken with sufficient seriousness because of the artificial nature of humility, or seen as utterly
vain and hopeless, because, as “shameful” we lack the drive and ability to attempt it. Humility in the
Ethik is construed as a sort of forfeiture of the moral endeavor due to a lack of sufficient hope in one’s
role in “tolerable ethical existence.”35 As we will see, Cohen’s estimation of humility changes in his
engagement with Maimonides.
However, before we move to his later work, it is important to discuss a remarkable moment in the Ethik,
in which Cohen reflects upon Judaism and antisemitism. Against the claims that Jews prize their
“atavistic community” over national and international commitments, and indeed, all other human
relations, Cohen makes an unexpected move. That is, given the tone of the rest of the text, one might
expect that Cohen would insist that Judaism, like Christianity, represents a relative community (relative
Gemeinschaft), which is to be subordinated to the Allheit of the ideal state.36 And while Cohen ultimately
concludes that it is the ethical state alone that can bind Jews and Christians together in harmony,37 he
nevertheless insists upon the distinguished nature of the Jewish prophetic tradition—still very much alive
in Judaism—and its “messianic idea.” He states, “It is not the adherence to a tribe [Stamm] and a
thousand year historical distinctiveness [ Besonderheit], which is able to explain the historical riddle of
the continued existence of the Jews. Rather, it is the force of the conviction that it is able to represent a
form of true Allheit through this historical idea.”38
What makes Cohen’s statement in regard to the Jews surprisingthen, is that in his endeavors to ground the
Self in genuine Allheit, he laboriously roots out those forms of “false honor [falsche Ehre],” or “the honor
of vanity [die Ehre der Eitelkeit],”39 which place the individual and the society on false bearings as a
result of a distorted view of the whole, i.e., an insufficiently rigorous notion of Allheit. In other words,
false honor occurs when a relative community takes itself as genuinely universal. Indeed, when discussing
why love cannot be the first-order virtue, he uses many examples from religion, “because religion has
made love into its fundamental concept [Grundbegriffe].”40 Thus it is surprising that he then suggests that
Judaism, although a religion, nevertheless has some access to Allheit and therefore is not merely a form of
culture “afflicted with myth,”41 whose “cultural maturity lies in ethics.”42
Indeed, if read with sufficient care, one senses a genuine hostility to Christianity in Cohen’s writings. In
fact, when Cohen initially explores the virtues and problematizes religion for having “made love into its
fundamental concept,” it is Augustine’s notion of the love of God, not Maimonides’, that is brought into
question.43 Additionally, when Cohen discusses honor, he explains that it “has its moral origin [ Ursprung]
in the language of religion,” as originally denoting the “fear of God.” However, he is very quick to point
out how Christianity erroneously translates this notion into “glory Herrlichkeit],” which ultimately results
in the transference of the worth of human beings “into the beyond.”44 It is Christianity, not Judaism, that is
guilty of “false honor,” the “honor of vanity,”45 and which has made the fateful error of mistaking itself
for a universal community—a community founded upon Allheit—when in fact it is only a relative
community. As a result, Christianity has generated an insufficiently rational basis for politics, ethics, and
indeed, the very formation of selves, which has lead to disastrous consequences historically.

Maimonides, God, and Judaism
While Cohen does not develop the relationship between Judaism and Allheit further in the Ethik, he
increasingly emphasizes it in his later thought. Indeed, Cohen’s dialogue with Maimonides is inextricably

linked with his account of Judaism’s relationship to Allheit. It is in his prolonged engagement with
Maimonides’ work that Cohen begins to think about ways in which God can remain at once the
foundational hypothesis and thus ultimate “ground” of Truth while nevertheless playing a direct role in
the ethical formation of the Self. In the Ethik, Cohen does not show much concern with the positive
functions that Maimonides’ “Attributenlehre’” might take. Rather, the emphasis is primarily upon God as
the Urgrund of truth, as transcendent to both the spheres of logic and ethics, as the hypothesis of their
Einklang. While Cohen lauds the “Attributenlehre” of Maimonides for maintaining a “restriction of
knowledge about od to those attributes which apply exclusively to human beings,” his praise primarily
emphasizes that this teaching does not impinge upon God’s transcendence.46
In Ethics of Maimonides, however, Cohen revisits Maimonides’s “Attributenlehre” as a possible way to
enable God to remain the Urgrund of Truth, and thus irreducible to either logic or ethics, while
nevertheless exerting a direct influence upon ethics. Cohen insists that Maimonides’ great contribution to
the philosophy of religion lies in his concerted effort to shift focus away from metaphysical inquiry about
God’s essence, directing it instead towards the ethical relationship between God and human beings. Thus,
“the concept of knowing God in Maimonides represents in substance exclusively the cognition of
ethics.”47 This is indeed a departure from the Ethik, where it is the individual qua juridical person in
relation to the ethical state that is the nexus in which the Self is constituted, as “not only the successful
end” but also the “proper beginning” for the individual striving to constitute—and constituting in its
striving— its ethical Self.48 However, Judaism is not a national state; indeed, Cohen thinks it is meant to
be stateless.
In his reading of Maimonides, Cohen finds a new function in the idea of God, that of the archetype for
morality, which serves as a new route by which to access Allheit, one that bypasses the state. In this new
reading, Cohen claims that for Maimonides “knowing God” is “exclusively the cognition of ethics. This is
the reason why he could not conceive of the principle and problem of God apart from the principle and
problem of man.”49 Cohen, via his reading of Maimonides, suggests that cognition of God constitutes a
new way of conceptualizing the Self as ethical task, such that God qua ideal now serves as the “successful
end” and “proper beginning.” By claiming that the idea of God and the idea of the human being, that is,
the moral Self, are inextricably bound up, Cohen does not deviate from his pronouncement on the second
page of the Ethik that “the object [Gegenstand] of ethics is the human being.”50 God too can play the role
of the ideal, an entry point to Allheit, in order to subsequently ground the Self of ethics. It is in this light
that we should read Cohen’s statement in the Ethics of Maimonides, that “ethics constitutes the
relationship between oneself and God, and as such the relationship between oneself and others as well as
one’s relationship to oneself.”51 The idea of God is the Grundlagen of ethics and thus of our ethical
relationships with Others.
Cohen is able to find such use in Maimonides because he denudes the medieval philosopher’s thought of
any metaphysical commitments, thus enabling his doctrine of the divine attributes to be read as purely
functional. In this sense, Cohen’s reading remains continuous with his previous discussion of Maimonides
and the “Attributenlehre” in the Ethik. That is, Cohen reads Maimonides’ limitation of human knowledge
about divine attributes as sufficiently methodologically rigorous to prevent any compromise regarding
God’s transcendence by any metaphyical trait that would disrupt the correlation between logic and ethics
constitutive of the Urgrund of truth upon which Cohen’s entire critical idealist system is “founded.” What
is new, however, is the suggestion that the idea of God is sufficiently universal, indeed more universal
than the ethical state, to serve as the ground and archetype for human morality. However, these attributes
are understood not as disclosing God’s metaphysical essence in itself but rather God’s function as a moral

exemplar for the construction of the moral Self. Or, as Cohen puts it, “the postulate of knowing God is the
sine qua non for [man’s] ethical subsistence. Hence it can only be cognition in which and by which man,
emulating God’s actions, builds himself through his own conduct into an ethical person.”52
But how, precisely, is God related to the construction of the moral Self ? This line of thinking is more
fully developed in Cohen’s posthumously published Religion. It is essential to recognize that Cohen
distinguishes two different levels when discussing God: Truth and holiness. Truth is the Einklang
between logic and ethics, while holiness is God’s role in morality. As we will see, Truth is the highest
embodiment of God, and thus truthfulness remains the highest virtue. However, it is in God’s holiness
that we see God’s capacity to serve as “conceptually determined models for the action of human beings
[die Musterbilder für die Handlung des Menschen].”53 In short, God, not the state, in Allheit is, at least for
the religious writings, the conceptual foundation for human action (Handlung) construed as the task of
creating the Self qua ideal through the pure will (the central emphasis of the Ethik.) Indeed, Cohen’s very
translation of Maimonides’s terminology  השעמה יראותas “Attribute der Handlung” alludes to the project
of the Ethik.54
According to Cohen, Maimonides’ completely rethinks our relation to God in the “Attributes of Action”
such that “the place of causality is . . . taken by purpose.”55 Maimonides’ rationalism purifies Judaism
from forms of love rooted in affect or in aesthetic voluptuousness, but rather roots it in ethical
knowledge.56 God now offers the foundation of action (Handlung) independent of the ideal state. Instead,
God in the function of God’s holiness grounds the Self in Allheit, and thus secures the Self ’s proper
rootedness in ideality. Thus religion parallels ethics in that it too provides grounding for the ideal self. But
just as love (even love of God as God of holiness) is the ground of virtues related to relative communities,
honor along with its chief virtue, truthfulness, remains the utmost virtue in its connection with Allheit. It
is at this point where Cohen’s new estimation of humility comes into play.

Reconfiguring Truthfulness and Modesty in a Religious Key
It is not uncommon to view Cohen’s turn in the Religion as but a new articulation of universal ethics in
Jewish clothing. However, to offer such a reading is to fail to sufficiently recognize the specific function
of humility vis-à-vis the Jews as a unique community, which Cohen terms a congregation (Gemeinde). As
I mentioned earlier, already as early as the Ethik, the Jewish community, or congregation, is by no means
to be understood as a relative community (relative Gemeinschaft) among others to be brought into accord
with Allheit. Rather, it is “the original soil of the Kingdom of God [Urboden des Gottesreiches].”57
In his introduction to the Religion, Cohen insists that ethics must maintain the distinction between “is”
and “ought,” as the ethical form of knowing is rooted in this distinction, and that the moral Self consists
in the striving to create itself in approximation of the ideal. However, for religion, “it must not be a matter
of indifference whether my morality and all men’s morality remains dutiful striving only, sufficient in
itself; rather, I have to take an interest in the question of whether the ideal has life and actuality.”58 Since
ethics is rooted in the distinction between the world as it is and the world as it ought to be,
methodologically speaking ethics must “maintain the separation of actuality from the ideal, and generally
between idea and actuality.” Religion stands in stark contrast to ethics in this sense. “The God of whom
religion teaches means nothing else but the repeal of this kind of prejudice of ethical rigor” and demands
with the prophets “the dominion of the good on earth.”59 Indeed, it is by means of the congregation, the
Jewish congregation, that Cohen reconciles God’s two functions, Truth and holiness, even if neither can
be fully realized in actuality, and thus the reconciliation must remain perpetually in process.60

In order to understand this shift we must understand what is at stake in this emphasis on the congregation.
Cohen explains, “Truth and holiness would be identical if holiness did not limit itself to morality, while
Truth unites the ideal of reason. Truth, therefore, is the binding link between science, including ethics, on
the one hand, and religion, on the other. If man must ask for his highest good he must ask for truth.”61
Even in the Religion, Cohen maintains the methodological distinction between ethics and logic. Thus,
when Kenneth Seeskin explains that “there is only one law and one goal; what differences there are
between ethics and religion have to do with the method we use to articulate them,”62 he can only be
referring to God’s holiness, which is God’s function in regard to ethics. There remains God’s Truth,
which is the connection between logic and ethics.
It is precisely here that we see the new religious inflection of Cohen’s virtues. Truthfulness then, is not a
virtue derived from God’s holiness (the construction of the ethical Self ), but rather, “follows . . . as a
consequence from God as the God of Truth.”63 “Jewish truthfulness,” as Cohen terms it, is both related to
truthfulness as conceived in the Ethik and yet it takes on a new dimension as well. To be sure, the
definition from the Ethik still applies, that truthfulness is the rigorous demand for the perpetual
purification of the Self through striving, self-examination, and the general “constant serious work of the
self to implement itself in so far as it can make itself actual.”64 However, Jewish truthfulness is rooted in
the “Unique God,”65 such that truthfulness becomes a virtue for the Jewish people. Just as the Self is a
task, so is the identity of the Jewish people as the “symbol” of “chosen mankind,” which rigorously
undergoes a “self-transformation [from] the chosen people” into a symbol of “messianic mankind.”66
Jewish truthfulness demands that “there can be only one unique worship of God, one unique love of God.
. . . Idolatry has to be destroyed absolutely.”67 The True God demands “true worship,”68 a requirement of
which is the shaming of the idol worshipper.69 True worship is not simply a critique of paganism qua nonJudaism, but rather a repudiation leveled against all forms of self-satisfaction, whether in the sacrificial
cult or in the nation. Idolatry is everywhere, not simply in certain rituals and objects of worship, but more
pointedly in pride and eudemonism, i.e., the basic failure to recognize the distinction between the actual
and ideal.70
It is precisely at this moment that Cohen’s revised estimation of humility becomes evident. Humility is a
virtue which prevents any pride on the part of the Jews vis-à-vis the Other. Cohen makes a great deal out
of Maimonides’ various discussions of humility. According to Daniel Frank, Maimonides’ notion of
humility is rooted in a critique of Aristotelian pride, which finds its justification in the recognition of
one’s peers. Frank notes that Maimonides’ virtuous man, the hasid, “cares not a whit for what the human,
all-too-human world, takes as significant,” given that the source of morality is grounded upon knowledge
of God, not the estimation of other people.71 Similarly, Cohen not only grounds the ultimate ethical
foundations in knowledge of God, but also rejects the present in favor of the ideal of the future, the
messianic. For Cohen, pride is contentment with the present, with one’s self and the world as it currently
is. This is the great sin, in that it is at odds with true knowledge of God, which entails that both one’s self
and the self of the Other are continually engaged in a process of creation and re-creation in light of the
ethical ideal; they are perpetual tasks which are never fixed.
To be sure, modesty continues to maintain the same function as it did in the Ethik, as the virtue which
provides “forbearance to my weakness, as well as the weakness of my fellowman,”72 such that I am not
overly harsh in my judgment of myself or the Other. Thus modesty “becomes a support for my love of my

fellow man, as well as for my own moral self-esteem.”73 However, we get a sense that this is no longer
sufficient for Cohen. When touching on his famous and oft-discussed notion of repentance,74 Cohen
explains that “I must in various ways try to come to terms with myself, and for this I need the selfknowledge of modesty, which, in the presence of great questions, leads me to humility.”75 To be sure, this
quote is rather ambiguous but it at least suggests that humility is of greater depth than modesty.
We get further insight into the nature of humility a paragraph later, when Cohen writes, “Humility alone
guards man from the danger of pride about his worth as man, a worth that is based only on his fear of
God, on his submission to God’s truth.”76 That is, if the Jews are the carriers of God’s truth and their task
is to shame the idolaters, it seems natural that they will become proud and have disdain for the Other.
Indeed, theorists such as Jan Assmann and Regina Schwartz have explored this attitude of religious
superiority in regard to the Abrahamic monotheisms to great controversy in recent years.77 However, with
the “Jewish” virtue (and I use this both in the sense that Cohen thinks that this is a virtue cultivated by
Jewish texts and that it is a communal virtue exhibited by the idealized Jewish people) of humility
counteracts such antagonistic attitudes towards the Other as rooted in pride, and thus being itself
idolatrous. Indeed, shame itself is part of the process of truthfulness, which is, in turn, bound to the virtue
of honor.
To understand humility and its Jewishness, we must return to the Ethik. In the Ethik, Cohen discusses the
importance of a criminal (Verbrecher) autonomously accepting his punishment, a process through which
“the moral self-consciousness [i.e., moral Self] is reclaimed [das sittliche Selbstbewusstsein wird
wiedergewonnen].”78 Cohen further explains that it is “the great achievement of punishment for the moral
Self of the criminal that he begins to lose the consciousness and character of the criminal with the onset of
punishment.”79 For Cohen in the Ethik, when the criminal recognizes his transgressions and willingly
accepts punishments for them, he is thereby freed of his guilt for them. Since the Self is a task, one is
able to reclaim one’s Self and begin again with the process of striving for the ideal by accepting
punishment. Indeed, Cohen’s later thought capitalizes on this basic concept in that sin, its recognition
and atonement, is the gateway to the discovery of the Self and its freedom.80
While the discussion of the criminal, like the discussion of the Jews and Allheit, is only an excursus in the
Ethik, it comes to full fruition in Cohen’s Religion. No longer operating in the context of the state but
rather in conjunction with God’s holiness, which is inextricably bound up with God’s Truth, Cohen turns
to Jewish sources to rethink the relationship between guilt and suffering. Once again, Maimonides is the
decisive figure in mediating/rationalizing the Jewish tradition for Cohen. Not only is Maimonides the
thinker who, at least in Cohen’s estimation, provides the conditions for thinking through God as both the
Einklang of logic and ethics (and thus as Truth), as well as God as the moral exemplar, the ethical
ideal by virtue of the attributes of action, i.e., as holiness, but he also establishes a basis through which
these two functions correspond. For Cohen, Maimonides discovers this correspondence with the
“profound idea that Job is also a prophet, that suffering is a genuine form of prophecy,” because
“suffering is a force in God’s plan of salvation.” However, like the punishment for the criminal in the
Ethik, the suffering only has meaning if one autonomously accepts it. Unlike the criminal who suffers to
reclaim himself, in this case, “the sufferer is considered as suffering for the sake of Others.”81 Again, this
implies a switch from mythical/metaphysical thinking, where one suffers because one did something
wrong, to a monotheistic/ ethical framework where one is focused on the telos or end towards which one
suffers.

The Jews willingly suffer as a testimony to the deepest grounds of Truth, the reality of the ideal. Jewish
statelessness is only a tragedy from the vantage point of a pragmatic, eudaemonist framework. In
fact, however, “he who recognizes the world-historical idea of messianic mankind as the task of the
Jewish people must recognize in Jewish history the signpost of this goal.”82 The Jewish congregation,
as an embodiment of humility, suffers as a testimony against “the acceptance of superficial human reality
as displayed in power, in splendor, in success, in dominion, in autocracy, in imperialism; as an opposition
to all these signs of human arrogance, to vain pride and to presumption.”83 In short, humility is the great
“Jewish” virtue insofar as it is the radical rejection of idolatry, whose modern form is all these
expressions of “human arrogance” and the failure to recognize the ethical ideal. Humility is no longer an
impediment to ethics as it was in the Ethik, but now part of the world-historical process of redemption.
When referring to Deutero-Isaiah, Cohen even goes so far as to claim that “in suffering for the peoples
Israel acquires the right to convert them. [. . .] This historical suffering of Israel gives it its historical
dignity, its tragic mission, which represents its share in the divine education of mankind.”84 Whereas in
the Ethik the criminal must voluntarily suffer his punishment to become free, here the Jew suffers
vicariously for the guilt/blindness of the Other. Indeed, Cohen reads the story of Jesus’ suffering and
death as vicarious atonement for the Other as distinctly Jewish. In fact, it “anticipated the history of the
‘remnant of Israel.’ And hence, according to this original poetic image, the historical Christ is actually the
history of Israel.”85 However, unlike the coupling of guilt and atonement in Christianity, in Cohen’s
Platonic account of Judaism, guilt is inextricably tied to a lack of knowledge. The suffering of the Jews,
then, does not so much take away the guilt of the Other—indeed, they merely suffer for the guilt of the
Other, they do not provide atonement—but in this suffering they testify to an order of Truth which the
Other ought to recognize but does not. (At least the Other does not recognize it yet.) And without this
recognition, without this Truth, the Other will continue to be stunted as she lacks genuine access to
Allheit. And thus the Jew suffers in bearing witness to the order of the ideal, to Truth.
To be sure, while Cohen stresses that religion, unlike ethics, demands that the gap between “is” and
“ought” be closed, this demand does not imply that this gap will actually be closed. Rather, it suggests
that Judaism in its deep rationality recognizes that an asymmetrical responsibility for the welfare of all
other peoples is thrust upon it. That is, the Jews must suffer for the Other, to shame the Others, in the
sense of making them aware of their ignorance so that they can renew the task of refining their moral
Selves upon proper foundations.
Judaism is not, however, identical with the religion of reason, because Judaism must be idealized. This
means both that the sources as they exist must be read through an idealizing hermeneutic which optimizes
their ethical possibilities, and that the empirical Jewish people cannot possibly live up to the ideal of the
congregation. Indeed, Cohen would be remiss to limit the idealized congregation to Jews. As he explains,
the idealization of the Jewish people, as the bearers of monotheism, “has already received into its bosom
‘the pious of the peoples of the world’ ” who “have their fully entitled share in this messianic suffering.”86
In short, Cohen’s discussion of Judaism is such that he does not equate Judaism and the religion of reason
not only because that would that eliminate the gap between “is” and “ought,” but also because Cohen’s
expansive, inclusivist definition of Judaism renders the Other as a Jew when she acts in accordance
with the religion of reason. When the Other acts in accordance with the virtue of humility, she testifies to
the reality of the ideal in spite of the all too immoral world. That is, she is Jewish regardless of her
professed empirical religion.

Maimonides and Cohen: A Final Thought
Cohen’s evolving engagement with Maimonides is undoubtedly complex and multifaceted but reveals
that his embrace of Judaism was not a break with idealism, nor a sudden reversal. Rather, already in the
Ethik Cohen attributes a unique role to the Jews and refuses to relativize them as one community among
others. It is in his prolonged engagement with Maimonides’ thought that Cohen works out the vocabulary,
particularly the increased predominance of humility, to offer a justification of Judaism that stresses its
uniqueness and the continued relevance of its world-historical mission without sacrificing ethical rigor.
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